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Abstract 
The current canonical and social statuses as well as the relationship of the largest Orthodox 
churches in Ukraine are considered: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine emerged on 
December 15, 2018, as a result of the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and a small number of 
representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. On January 6, 
2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in accordance with the decision of the Synod of 
the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate, together with the Synodals, signed the Tomos on the 
autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This Church identifies itself with World 
Orthodoxy, admits the Constantinopolitan church as its mother church and is recognized by it. 
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was formally proclaimed on the 
eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union on October 25-27, 1990, on the basis of the Ukrainian 
Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, which existed before. It has the status of a self-
governing church within the Russian Orthodox Church, which it recognizes as the mothe r 
church, and within which it has been part of various state institutions since the 17th century 
and up to the present. The civilizational nature of the confrontation between these churches in 
Ukraine is substantiated. This confrontation goes beyond modern history and concerns the 
interpretation of almost every event (often ecclesiastical) from the individual or common past 
of Ukraine and Russia. The confrontation has intensified in connection with efforts by the 
current Russian authorities to impose a common civilizational future on Ukraine, using and 
including for this purpose a religious factor. The newly established Orthodox Church of 
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Ukraine supports the Orthodox-Ukrainophile and European integrational aspirations of the 
overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian citizens. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the 
Moscow Patriarchate is focused on cooperation with Russia and upholds the idea of “Eastern 
European Orthodoxy” as part of the “Orthodox-Moscow civilization component.” Among the 
causes concerning the current stage of confrontation are the following: the fundamenta l ly 
different attitudes regarding the events of the Revolution of Dignity, the occupation of the 
Crimea and the war in the eastern part of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s geopolitical future. It is 
reasonable to expect that in the near future, the internal Orthodox confrontation in Ukraine will 
continue because of the severity of the conflict situation and the unpreparedness for the 
dialogue of these churches. However, in the long run, the independence of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the development of the Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine and also changing generations of priesthood and believers of these churches, 
cooperation and, as a result, reconciliation between them are inevitable.  
Keywords: Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow 
Patriarchate, Tomos, canonical status, civilizational identity, confrontation, reconciliation. 
Introduction 
Since the beginning of Ukraine’s independence, one of the aspects of escalation of 
tension in the Ukrainian society has been manifested through the line of an intra-Orthodox 
confrontation. Over the last three decades, this tendency has not disappeared, and 
unfortunately, the level of tension has not been reduced. It is natural that the peaks of these 
crises accounted for the fateful moments, times of change associated with civilizationa l, 
geopolitical choices made by the country. These include such important periods as the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and attainment of Ukraine’s independence (1991), the Orange Revolut ion 
(2004), the Revolution of Dignity (late 2013 to early 2014), Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, 
and Russia’s military aggression in the East (from 2014 up to the present moment). The latest 
extremely tangible crisis in relations within the Orthodox environment is associated with the 
formation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (the authentic transliterated abbreviation is PCU 
(ПЦУ); OCU is the international abbreviation that we will use hereafter), which has been 
growing since 2019. What is the survivability of this confrontation between co-religionis ts? 
Why does the persistent desire of the citizens of poly-denominational Ukraine (according to 
different data, from 43%1 to 54%2), to have their own local Orthodox Church rather than to 
1 “Майже половина українців підтримує створення в Україні помісної автокефальної церкви. Дослідження 
проведене соціологічною службою Центру Разумкова спільно з Фондом “Демократичні ініціативи” імені 
Ілька Кучеріва з 19 по 25 грудня 2018 р.”. 
2 “Ставлення українців до створення єдиної помісної церкви. Згідно з результатами дослідження, 
проведеного Соціологічною групою “Рейтинг” з 27 вересня по  4 жовтня 2018 р.” 
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belong to another country’s Orthodox Church cause such resistance in the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (hereinafter the UOC MP)? Is the claim of the UOC MP 
justified? Why have not even the recognition of the OCU autocephaly in the Orthodox world 
and the establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine reconciled the Orthodox Ukrainians 
with each other? What are the consequences and prospects of resolving this conflict? 
Current Canonical and Social Status of the Largest Orthodox Churches in Ukraine 
Orthodoxy in Ukraine is represented by the following churches: Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine (about 7,000 communities); the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate (about 12,000 communities); the Russian Orthodox Old Believers Church 
(Belokrynitsky Consent) (54 communities); the Russian True Orthodox Church (36 
communities); the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (30 communities); and different factions 
of the Russian Orthodox Old Believers Church (about 30 communities).3 The last four churches 
are fundamentalist, small, and non-influential. The major confrontations about values of 
significance for the destiny of Ukraine, Europe and, to some extent, the world are centered on 
the ideological confrontation between the two largest Orthodox churches—the OCU and the 
UOC MP. 
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (the OCU) was recognized as independent and equal 
to all other sister-church more than a year ago. It arose on December 15, 2018 as a result of the 
merger of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (the UOC KP), the 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (the UAOC) and a small number of representatives 
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (the UOC MP). On January 6, 
2019, in accordance with the decision of the Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew together with the Synodals, signed the Tomos on the 
autocephaly of the OCU.4 These events, as well as the internalization of Metropolitan Epiphany 
(in the text of the Tomos -- Ἐπιφανίῳ (in Greek),   Epifanios (in English)) as the Primate of the 
church, were the final stages of this church’s long and difficult journey to autocephaly. The 
OCU identifies itself with World Orthodoxy, recognizes the Church of Constantinople as its 
mother-church and is also recognized by it.  
                                                                 
3 “Дані Департаменту у справах релігій та національностей Міністерства культури України. Форма 1. Звіт 
про мережу церков і релігійних організацій в Україні станом на 01.01.2019 р.” РІСУ.  
4 “Patriarchal and Synodal Tomos for the Bestowal of the Ecclesiastical Status of Autocephaly to the Orthodox 
Church in Ukraine.” Ecumenical Patriarchate.  
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In addition to the historical right of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to autocephaly, 
the reason for its granting was the need to unite the Orthodox communities in Ukraine. Patriarch 
Bartholomew of Constantinople explained his decision on the necessity of giving the Tomos to 
the OCU in the following way: “When our brother is considered a schismatic or a heretic, and 
even more so when the whole nation, millions of people are outside the canonical Church under 
the pretext of a split, then we are called immediately, without delay, to a spiritual and apostolic 
vigilance, because “when one member suffers, all members suffer together with him.”5 
According to the plan of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, after the formation of the united 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine, all other Orthodox churches in the territory of Ukraine should 
either enter into its membership or legitimize their true canonical status. In particular, the UOC 
MP, as part of the Russian Orthodox Church, should formalize this status and be officia l ly 
called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (this was the name the 
Church had until 2007), or the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (which is more in line 
with its essence). By the same token, it is also required by the amendments made in 2018 of 
the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (part 7, article 12).6  However, 
the case of renaming is now being delayed due to the opposition, namely lawsuits to the state 
body responsible for state-church relations by the UOC MP hierarchs. 
The OCU supports Orthodox-Ukrainophile and European integration aspirations of the 
overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian citizens. It is currently in the process of establishing 
and developing its structure, determining the priorities of its domestic and foreign policies. As 
of early 2020, the OCU was recognized by the Alexandrian Patriarchate and the Hellenic 
Orthodox Church together with the Constantinople Orthodox Church, taking into consideration 
the fact that neither the Ecumenical Patriarchate break the Eucharistic relationship with the 
Moscow Patriarchate, nor did the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Its head, Metropolitan 
Epiphanius, has repeatedly expressed his readiness for dialogue and regulation of relations 
between Orthodox churches in Ukraine for the benefit of the Ukrainian society.   
                                                                 
5 Варфоломій, патріарх. “Я – не «Східний Папа. Інтерв’ю із Константинопольським  патріархом  
Варфоломієм.”  РІСУ. 28.02.2019.  
6 “A religious organization (association) which, directly or as an integral part of another religious organization 
(association), belongs to a structure (is part of) a religious organization (association) whose guidance centre 
(management) is located outside Ukraine in the state, which is recognized by law as having engaged in military  
aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupying part of the territory of Ukraine, obliged in its full title, 
specified in its charter (statute) to display affiliation with a religious organization (association) outside Ukraine 
and to which it belongs (part of which it is), by obligatory mentioning in its name of the full statutory name of 
such religious organization (association) with the possible addition of the words “in Ukraine" and / or designation 
of its place in the structure of a foreign religious organization.”  
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It is no coincidence that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate 
has been preserved in Ukraine. This church expresses other social demands and sentiments of 
that part of the Ukrainian citizens, who profess conservatism, or, having the Russian or Soviet 
identity, are nostalgic for their homeland, with which they identify themselves, and that, of 
course, does not exclude other vital motives, according to which the faithful choose that 
confession. 
The UOC MP was formally formed on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union on 
October 25-27, 1990, on the basis of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, 
which existed here before. It has a status of a self-governing church within the Russian 
Orthodox Church, which is recognized as the mother-church by it, and within which it has been 
part of various state institutions since the 17th century and up to the present. Metropolitan 
Onufrius is the head of this church. The UOC MP has significant human and material resources , 
an extensive community system, and strong political connections established over the time, 
thus influencing the Ukrainian society. In view of the subordinated position of the UOC MP to 
the Moscow Patriarchate and the decision of the governing bodies of the Russian Orthodox 
Church,7  the UOC MP is forced to comply with the decision of the Synod of the Russian 
Orthodox Church of October 15, 2018, to break the Eucharistic communion with the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople, and it does not recognize the legitimacy of the Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine any more.8 The leader of the UOC MP, Metropolitan Onufriy (Onuphrius), 
following Moscow’s church propagandists, is trying to characterize the Tomos for the OCU as 
a political project.9  However, in Ukraine, the position of the Primate of the UOC MP has been 
significantly shaken from the canonical view point. In the new annual edition of the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople issued in 2019 with the  listing of hierarchies of all diptychia l 
Orthodox churches, the former “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine” Onufriy (Berezovsky) 
was no longer mentioned with such a title. All bishopric of the UOC MP was named with 
reference to the hierarch’s residence. The most vivid example was the following: “Onuphrius, 
Metropolitan in Kiev.” This deprivation of the episcopal title deprives him of the priestly office 
in the territory of another church, because, according to the Orthodox canons, there can be only 
one bishop in one diocese and not two or more. It should be noted that before the Unifica t ion 
                                                                 
7 “Устав Русской Православной Церкви. Глава X. Украинская Православная Церковь.”  Русская 
Православная Церковь”. Официальный сайт. 02.12.2017.  
8 “Журнал № 71 заседания Священного Синода от 15 октября 2018 года. Русская Православная Церковь.” 
Официальный сайт.  
9 See: “Пресс-конференция предстоятеля УПЦ: о церкви, собрании в Аммане и раскольнической ПЦУ.” 
Православная жизнь. 28.02.2020.  
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Council of 2018, at which the OCU was created, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I sent 
a letter to Metropolitan Onuphrius, in which it was stated that after the Unification Council he 
would not be able to bear the title “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine” because this title 
would be given to the newly elected Primate of the Church.10 
As of 2019, the UOC MP has about 12,000 communities; the OCU in total about 7,000 
communities.11  Although the OCU MP communities are still transitioning to the OCU, the 
UOC MP will remain the largest church in Ukraine for the short term. Due to the number of 
communities, the OCU is inferior to the OCU MP. However, the assessment of the size of 
churches by this criterion is very conditional. Only 10 adults are required to register a 
community. Therefore, a community of 10 people and a community of thousands have the 
same position in statistics. All over the world, the number of believers is determined by 
sociologists. Taking this criterion into consideration, according to the All-Ukrainian poll, as of 
January 2020, 34% of them consider themselves as members of the OCU, whereas only 13.8% 
(2.5 times less) as the faithful of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate.  A significant percentage 
of those who are Orthodox, but do not refer to any of these churches are 27.6%,12 which 
requires a separate analysis. According to another poll, also conducted in January 2020 by 
another sociological company, 38.6% of the Ukrainian citizens attributed themselves to the 
parishes of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, headed by Metropolitan Epiphaniy. And only 
20.7% to the parishioners of the UOC Moscow Patriarchate, headed by Metropolitan Onufriy.13  
It should be noted that in both the first and second cases, polls were conducted throughout 
Ukraine except the occupied territories of the Crimea and parts of Donbas.  
The situation described above only outlines the urgency of the issue and the need to 
analyze the socio-historical and meaningful context of the development of Orthodoxy in 
independent Ukraine. This requires at least a brief excursion into history, which will help to 
understand the specifics of the “Orthodox issue” in Ukraine. 
 
                                                                 
10 “Щорічне видання Вселенського патріархату не визнає титулів єпископів МП в Україні.” 23.01.2020.  
11 “Дані Департаменту у справах релігій та національностей Міністерства культури України. Форма 1. Звіт 
про мережу церков і релігійних організацій в Україні станом на 01.01.2019 р.” РІСУ. 
12 “Конфесійна та церковна належність громадян України, (січень 2020 р.). Дослідження проведене 
соціологічною службою Центру Разумкова з 17 по 21 січня  2020 року.”  Разумков Центр.  
13 “Парафіянами ПЦУ називають себе 38,6% українців, парафіянами УПЦ (МП) 20,7%. Дані опитування, 
проведеного “Центром соціального моніторингу” і Українським інститутом соціальних досліджень ім.     
О. Яременка. 24-28.01.2020.” 
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The Civilizational Basis of Internal Confrontation of Orthodox Churches in Ukraine 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine became catalytic 
agents for a radical transformation of the spiritual space of the Ukrainian society. In the early 
1990s, the return of religion to the sphere of cultural and spiritual life of independent Ukraine 
took place against the background of a so-called religious “explosion” (a rapid increase in the 
number of religious communities). These processes were also accompanied by certain 
unexpected (as for believers) consequences; it was a matter of physical violence (blocking the 
change of jurisdictions, raider seizure of temples, theft of documents, etc.). Such destructive 
actions almost always took place on all sides of the conflict. But the main confrontation was at 
the level of ideologies. The Russian messianic idea of “Moscow—the Third Rome” (and its 
current modified version, the concept of the “Russkiy Mir” (The Russian World)) has come 
into a fierce struggle with the attempts of the Ukrainians to restore their own cultural and 
civilizational paradigm (the idea of the autocephaly of Orthodoxy in Ukraine). 
These patterns were first discovered in the late 20th century, following the restoration 
of the structures of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (hereinafter referred to as 
the UAOC) in the country. In the 1990s, Metropolitan Filaret, the head of the exarchate of the 
Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, who headed the Metropolitanate of the Moscow Patriarchate 
in Ukraine since 1966, opposed this process. In 1992, Metropolitan Filaret was personally 
persecuted by the leadership of his church (the Moscow Patriarchate), which prompted him to 
ally himself with the then UAOC, which became the basis for the creation of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (hereinafter referred to as the UOC KP). In fact, with 
the restoration of the UAOC structures in Ukraine, and later with the formation of institut ions 
of the UOC KP, one can speak of the beginning of the revival of the Orthodox-Ukrainophile 
identity. 
Since the declaration of independence, the question of the religious affiliation of the 
Ukrainians has been gradually moving from the zone of a personal ideological choice to the 
area of certain social orientations. First and foremost, it is a matter of a general-cultural and 
civic identity, when the denominational affiliation “actually takes on the function of a 
civilizational and political marker; and this is reflected in many events and rhetoric involving 
religious institutions.”14 It is the Orthodox-Ukrainophile identity that began to actively oppose 
the so-called “Eastern European Orthodox civilization,” about which many people, such as M. 
                                                                 
14 See: И. Яковенко. “Украина: религиозно-цивилизационная составляющая политических конфликтов.” 
Религия и конфликт.  (Москва: Центр Карнеги,  2007), p. 48. 
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Danilevsky, A. Toynbee, S. Huntington, O. Spengler and others in due time wrote. However, 
all the authors, except for S. Huntington, did not actually single out the “Ukrainian factor” in 
the mentioned civilization. Instead, the political theorist of the 20th century, S. Huntington 
warned about the existence of internally divided states—relatively-culturally homogeneous, 
but which did not agree on what civilization they belonged to.15 By a number of criteria, he 
referred to Ukraine as such. “Internal divisiveness” means that citizens with different 
civilizational identities live in Ukraine, which hinders the formation of a single consolidated 
political nation because of their vulnerability to multi-vector civilizational influences. 
There is quite a number of markers of these cultural and civic identit ies : 
promoting/counteracting European integration efforts; attitude towards Ukraine’s accession to 
NATO; evaluation and interpretation of Ukrainian history and its heroes; efforts to restore the  
Ukrainian language and traditions in the churches (including the restoration of the Ukrainian 
pronunciation in the Old Church Slavonic language); evaluation by the Orthodox clerics and 
institutions of the Orange Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity; assessment of the 
phenomenon and pastoral work in the zones of military aggression against Ukraine (the 
annexed Crimea, the controlled or captured areas of Donbas); intensity and orientation of social 
work; participation in volunteer work, product gathering and other necessary military supplies; 
and cooperation with the Ukrainian security, defence and law enforcement agencies 
(chaplaincy, moral support, educational work, etc.). 
The reasons for this situation are rooted in the history of Ukraine and need to be 
thoroughly considered separately. Let us note the main thing—the territories that belong to 
modern Ukraine have been within the boundaries of different state entities for several centuries. 
In addition, the mass destruction of the Ukrainians took place over several centuries: they were 
killed in wars, died of several waves of famine (the Holodomor) purposely caused by the 
authorities of the former Soviet state, died in rebellions against different regimes, suffered 
repression, and the like. The country was constantly losing its elite. In the Soviet Union, there 
was a clear political strategy for the assimilation of ethnic groups and the formation of a new 
community (the “Soviet people”). The formation of the Soviet people as a historical, social and 
international community of people was officially proclaimed in 1971, at the 24th CPSU 
Congress,16 but in fact it continued throughout the history of the Soviet Union. This ideology 
                                                                 
15 С. Хантингтон. Столкновение цивилизаций. (М: ООО Издательство АСТ, 2003), p. 34 
 
16 “Советский народ.” Российские универсальные энциклопедии. Энциклопедии Брокгауз-Ефрон и Большая 
Советская Энциклопедия объединенный словник.  
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was based on the manipulation and substitution of concepts. Among the “fifteen Soviet 
republics-sisters” (as they were then called), Russia was considered an “older” one, which led 
to the total Russification of the entire Soviet space. The identity of the Russian ethnic group —
the most numerous in the territory of the former Soviet Union—was recognized as an 
instrument of unification that affected all spheres of social life. Taking into consideration that 
the Soviet Union existed for quite a long period of time (1922-1991), for almost 70 years, a 
generation of people, who really considered themselves the Soviet people, has grown. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, such people, being within the boundaries of the restored 
nation-states, did not lose their Russian-Soviet identity, which was a strange fusion of 
ethnocentrism and cosmopolitanism. 
The Moscow Patriarchate at all times of its history acted in harmony with the power 
structures of Russia (earlier name - Muscovy), which, incidentally, did not contradict the so-
called symphony of secular and ecclesiastical powers. This should contribute to the unity of 
the church, state, and community. However, in historical retrospect, it has often led to negative 
transformations: from the symphony of the authorities to the caesaropapism; from Orthodox 
patriotism to etatism.17 Nor was it an exception after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when 
the Moscow Patriarchate in fact declared its doctrine “to protect the interests of the Russians 
and their compatriots abroad.” One of the organizational forms of such activity was the creation 
of the World Russian People’s Council (hereinafter referred to as the (ARNS) by the Moscow 
Patriarchate. According to the statute of the ARNS, the head of the Council is the Patriarch of 
Moscow, with the blessing and under whose chair the annual council meetings are held. 18  
These meetings are funded by the Russian government and are held on the basis of church 
institutions. A peculiar credo of such activity is the “gathering of the “Russkiy Mir” (the 
Russian World), which, according to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation I. Ivanov, “is a joint affair (common cause) of the Russian state and the Russian 
Orthodox Church.”19 This demonstrates the undisguised efforts of the secular authorities of the 
Russian Federation to use the powerful tool of the Russian Orthodox Church to keep Ukraine 
in the Moscow-Russian civilization zone (in the realm of its identity). 
                                                                 
17 Н. В. Іщук. Соціальна адаптація православ’я: філософський аналіз. (Київ: КНУШ, 2007), p. 13. 
18 “Всемирный Русский Народный Собор (ВРНС).” Русская Православная Церковь. Официальный сайт 
Московского патриархата.  
19 “Выступление Министра иностранных дел России И.С.Иванова на VIII Всемирном Русском Народном 
Соборе, Сергиев Посад, 3 февраля 2004 г.”  Русская Православна Церковь. Архив официального сайта 
Московського Патриархата (1997- 2009).  
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How did this mechanism work (is working)? First of all, it is about the alogica l 
extension of the area of activity/influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine with the help 
of the UOC MP subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate and the emergence of the interests of 
its supporters into the political space (body politic). Thus, such phenomenon was formed, 
which in the decisions of the Bishops’ Council of the UOC MP, held on December 21, 2007 in 
the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, was designated and condemned as “political Orthodoxy”20 (the 
essence of this phenomenon was quite fully enlightened in the research made by archimandrite 
Cyril Hovorun21). 
It is worth paying tribute to Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan, who headed the UOC 
MP from 1992 to 2014. He tried to keep the church out of politics and repeatedly warned that 
“political Orthodoxy,” in terms of which “some churchgoers often speak out, is a very 
dangerous phenomenon that takes people away from Orthodoxy, as transmitted to us by the 
Fathers of the Church. “It ignites political passions, provokes disobedience to the hierarchy, 
and sows seeds of discord in the Church. I emphasize that our Church is out of politics."22  It 
should be added that Metropolitan Volodymyr showed a rather constructive stance in conflict 
with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church, calling for an understanding of the possibilities of overcoming the conflict 
in the framework of meetings, dialogue and specific matters, which would melt the ice between 
the churches.23  There were even negotiations held on unification with the UAOC in due time. 
Unfortunately, these attempts were almost completely offset by his successor, Metropolitan 
Onufriy, who has been heading the church since 2014. 
The majority of researchers see the indicators of Ukraine’s civilizational choice also 
assessing the events in the Orange Maidan (2004-2005) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013-
2014). After all, the main idea of both Ukrainian Maidans was the struggle against the Soviet-
Russian identity, which has now taken on a distinct imperial form, and the struggle against the 
Russian Federation’s attempt to restore the Soviet Union in the newest version. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the UOC MP supported every refusal of Ukraine’s accession to the European 
Union.24 The clerics of this church also tried to focus their faithful church members on 
disadvantages of the European choice. The theme of “Sodomites of Europe” was especially 
                                                                 
20 “Звернення Собору єпископів Української Православної Церкви до її вірних чад.” Українська 
Православна Церква. Офіційний сайт.  
21 Кирило Говорун, архімандрит. Політичне православ'я. (Київ: Дух і Літера,  2019).  
22 “Виступ Блаженнішого Митрополита Київського і всієї України Володимира на Архієрейському Соборі 
Української Православної Церкви, 21 грудня 2007 р.” Українська Православна Церква. Офіційний сайт.  
23 Ibid.  
24 “Януковича порівняли з Христом.”  ВолиньPost, 2014. 23 січня. 
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frequently emphasized, trying to prove that Europeans had chosen the anti-Christian path of 
spiritual development and that the movement to the EU and NATO was the path to 
destruction.25  In advance, let us note that that campaign was not successful—now over 68% 
of the Ukrainians are supporting the movement to the European Union and over 51% of them 
want to join NATO).26 
At that time, the clergy and believers of the UOC KP and UAOC were opposed by the 
representatives of the UOC MP against the European perspective of Ukraine. They were not 
alone in their position, but they came out and spoke with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, 
the All-Ukrainian Union of Pentecostal Evangelical Churches, and many other churches. The 
reasoning of that camp concerned the issues of statehood (and the possibility of its loss upon 
rapprochement with Russia), moral responsibility to posterity for the loss of language and 
culture, etc. Therefore, at first it was not “about the religious aspect, but socio-political, and 
the religious leaders in this case acted as citizens of Ukraine.”27 
The position of the Orthodox churches was particularly clear during the Revolution of 
Dignity. It was the night of November 30, 2013, which dramatically changed the situation when 
the police officers of Berkut (golden eagle) beat students who were protesting in the Maidan 
and then were hiding in St. Michael’s Orthodox Monastery (the structure of the UOC KP). In 
fact, the “religious” component of the protest was “turned on.” According to some religious 
leaders, the events in the Maidan went beyond confrontation between politicians and “became 
a clash of truth with falsehood.”28  At the same time, “the active involvement of believers and 
religious activists in the protest was developing, and prayer tents were emerging.”29 In that 
situation, the UOC MP demonstrated a different position, as if calling for reconciliation, but 
was in fact protecting the existing regime. In the tragic moments of confrontation, they chose 
the path of staying in “symphony” with the authorities, not with their people. 
The dependence of the UOC MP on the Moscow Patriarchate was critically threatening 
during the direct aggression of Russia against Ukraine. Since December 2017 (after introduc ing 
some amendments to the Statute of the Moscow Patriarchate), the clergy of the UOC MP are 
obliged (according to the Statute of the Church and Church Discipline) to implement in Ukraine 
                                                                 
25 “Глава УПЦ МП выступил против интеграции Украины в Евросоюз.” Одна Родина. Информационно-
аналитическое издание. (2013).  
26 “За вступление Украины в ЕС готовы проголосовать 68,1% украинцев, в НАТО - 51,1%.”  Європейська 
правда. 14.06.2019.  
27 See: Д. Брильов. “Церкви постали перед вибором: йти за Майданом чи намагатись його вести за собою.” 
РІСУ. 26.12.2013.  
28 “Михайло Паночко про Євромайдан: ‘Це не протистояння між політиками, а сутичка правди з 
неправдою’” Релігія в Україні.  08.01.2014.  
29 Т. А. Калениченко. “Від учора на Майдані діє молитовний міжконфесійний намет.” РІСУ.  06.12.2013. 
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the doctrine of the “Russkiy Mir” (the Russian World), which is now being implemented by 
the current authorities of the Russian Federation jointly with Orthodox Church. That is, the 
Ukrainian clerics of the UOC MP, hierarchically subordinate to the patriarch, who proclaims 
through both sermons and activities the Russian national idea, Russian patriotism and ideology 
of the “Russkiy Mir,” thus objectively implementing the Russian civilization idea in Ukraine. 
The Moscow Patriarchate cooperates closely not only with the state structures of the 
Russian Federation, but also with the political and public organizations of the nationa list 
movement. It is about the Russian National Council, the Black Hundred organizations and 
movements like the “Sorok Sorokov” and so on. This tradition of cooperation has a long 
history—both in tsarist and Soviet times, the Orthodox Church was brutally used by the 
authorities to impose chauvinist ideas on the local population. For this, in almost all regions of 
Ukraine, except for the direct propaganda in sermons and activities, many Ukrainophob ic 
ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical media were printed (“Triyedinaya Rus”, “Novorossiysk iy 
Vestnik,” “Pochayevskiy Listok,” “Spasite Nashi Dushi,” etc.), which contained articles that 
brought into question the existence of the Ukrainian people, told about the artificial nature of 
the Ukrainian language, denied the expediency of the existence of the Ukrainian state, etc. 
Particularly dangerous for the Ukrainian realities is the fact that the Moscow 
Patriarchate has signed agreements with all power (and not power) ministries and agencies of 
Russia30 regarding the “spiritual and moral enlightenment” of employees, their patriotic 
upbringing, etc. A special Synodal Department for cooperation with the Armed Forces and 
human rights bodies of the Russian Federation31 was created in 1995 to implement these 
agreements. Prior to the annexation of the Crimea and the hostilities in the Donbas region, this 
situation for some reasons did not cause much concern in Ukraine. Therefore, the chaplains of 
the UOC MP were in key positions in the Ukrainian security forces. However, the involvement 
of the Moscow Patriarchate in cooperation with the Russian power ministries is acquiring new 
significance and weight after the events of February-March 2014, when the Russian troops 
invaded the Crimea and then the Donbas. A certain natural result of this is the fact that 
practically all the UOC MP clerics in the occupied territories have supported anti-Ukrainian 
30 “Доклад Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла на Архиерейском совещании 2 февраля 2010 годa”; 
”Соглашение о сотрудничестве между Министерством Российской Федерации по делам гражданской 
обороны, чрезвычайным ситуациям и ликвидации последствий стихийных бедствий и Русской 
Православной Церковью»; «Соглашение о взаимодействии Русской Православной Церкви и Федеральной 
миграционной службы России”; “Соглашение о сотрудничестве между Русской Православной Церковью 
и Федеральной таможенной службой России.” 
31 “Синодальный отдел по взаимодействию с Вооруженными Силами и правоохранительными органами.” 
Русская Православна Церковь.» Официальный сайт Московского патриархата. 
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actions and are actively cooperating with the occupiers.32 In this respect, it is not surprising 
that there is an actual compliance of the actions and statements of the leadership and clergy of 
the UOC MP in the Ukrainian-controlled territories with the actions and statements of 
politicians from the Russian Federation.33 
It should be noted that the UOC MP is not the only Orthodox Church in Ukraine based 
on non-Ukrainian cultural and civilizational foundations. For example, during the “Russian 
Spring” 2014, the Russian Orthodox Old Believers Church (hereinafter referred to as the 
ROOBC) in Ukraine much more actively supported the occupation actions of the Russian 
authorities in the Crimea and the Donbas than the UOC MP. Few Crimean parishes of the 
Russian Orthodox Church were immediately transferred from the Kyivan Diocese to the 
Moscow Diocese, and special prayers were introduced at worship services about the “Russian 
soldiery” and the “conquest of enemies and adversary.”34  And now the Kremlin is developing 
plans to finance church and commercial projects of the Russian Orthodox Church in order to 
use the foreign policy potential of Old Believers, or even to transform them into one of the 
ideological platforms of the “Russkiy Mir”35 together with the Moscow Patriarchate. However, 
in Ukraine, the ROC is rather a marginal structure (not numerous, only about 100 and divided 
between communities of different movements). Therefore, Old Believers in Ukraine are 
virtually not visible in public or political life. 
Recently, a number of conflicts between the Ukrainian Orthodox churches have been 
associated with transitions—changing the jurisdiction of church communities. It is about the 
transition of the UOC MP communities to the jurisdiction of the UOC. The order of transit ions 
is regulated by the current law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
                                                                 
32 See: O. Sagan. “Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Current State and Problems.” In Traditional religion and political 
power: Examining the role of the church in Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova . London: The Foreign Policy  
Centre or the Open Society Foundations, (2015): 16-22; Т. А. Калениченко.  Релігійна складова суспільно-
політичного конфлікту кінця 2013-2017 рр. в Україні. Дис. на здобуття наук. ступ. к.філос.н. Нац. пед. ун-
т ім. М.П.Драгоманова. ( Київ, 2018);  “Московська патріархія стала на сторону агресора – Віктор  
Єленський.” Релігія в Україні. 05.02.2015; “На Донбассе воюет ‘Русская православная армия.’”. Релігія в 
Україні. 13.05.2014; M. Васін,  “Донбас і Крим: нові виклики для релігійної свободи. Підсумки року.”  
РІСУ. 24.12.2014. 
33 This is a situation that arose during a solemn sitting of the Ukrainian Parliament, when President Poroshenko 
was reading out the names of the heroes of Ukraine who had received that title during an anti-terrorist operation 
in the east of Ukraine. All the present MPs and guests, including foreign diplomats, stood by honoring the heroes. 
The representatives of the UOC MP, headed by Onufriy, did not do so.  See: “Представители УПЦ МП не 
встали при зачитывании имен бойцов АТО - героев Украины. Онуфрий остался сидеть, несмотря на то, 
что встали даже иностранцы.” LB.ua. 09.05.2015; Б. Костюк. “Ми перейшли до Київського патріархату  
через антиукраїнську позицію багатьох священиків УПЦ (МП) – протоієрей Сергій Дмитрієв.” Радіо 
Свобода. 08.01.2017.   
34 See: А. Солдатов. “После нас хоть протопоп. Зачем Кремлю старообрядцы и как они проявили себя в 
Крыму и на Украине.” Новая газета. 21.10.2019. 
35 Ibid. 
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Organizations.”36 In particular, Article 8 declares the right of each community to freely change 
its subordination “by amending the statutes (regulations) of the religious community.” 
Decisions on such a change of subordination are made at an authorized general meeting of a 
religious community (this requires two-thirds of the votes present at the meeting). Those in the 
community who do not agree with the decision on change of subordination have the right to 
form a new religious community and to enter into an agreement on the procedure of using the 
buildings for public worship and property with their owner (user). The decision to change 
subordination and to amend the statute accordingly, shall be certified by the signatures of the 
members of the respective religious community who supported the decision and shall be subject 
to registration in accordance with the procedure established by Article 14 of the same Law. 
Unfortunately, despite the transparent regulation of the problem, in practice, these 
legislative provisions do not always work properly and then tend to create conflicts. This is 
inevitable in conditions where Orthodox communities lack a fixed membership. This also gives 
room for some intrigues on both sides. In particular, the adherents of the UOC MP accuse the 
supporters of the OCU that they substitute the term “religious community” with the term 
“territorial community.”     
Indeed, in some settlements, it is almost impossible to differentiate these concepts. For 
example, all the villagers consider themselves to be parishioners of the village temple and 
therefore donate money to the temple,37 perform the necessary rituals and sacraments there, 
etc. However, not all of them regularly attend Sunday worships or holiday services. This 
enables the priests of the UOC MP, who do not support the desire of the community to change 
jurisdiction, to gather alternative meetings of the religious community (a limited number of 
persons who support the position of the priest) and to decide on the inviolability of their 
jurisdictional rights. A striking example could be given concerning the events in the village of 
Morozivka (Kyiv region) when, after the general meeting and the community decision, the 
priest held an alternative meeting.38 It should be noted that there are practically no such abuses 
by the clerics of the OCU. After all, there is no notice of any reverse movement—the transition 
of communities from the OCU to the UOC MP, except cases when a community withdrew 
from the UOC MP, but failed to defend its choice in court.   
                                                                 
36 “Закон України ‘Про свободу совісті та релігійні організації,’” Законодавство України. 
37 The Slavic word hram refers to the church building and is often translated as temple.   
38 Believers of the religious community of Holy Assumption Parish of Morozivka village, Baryshevsky district in 
the Kyiv region, whose priest decided to "return" to the ROC in Ukraine, stated their desire to be part of the OCU). 
See: “Громада на Київщині не погодилася зі священиком, який ‘повернувся’ до РПЦвУ, і опечатала храм.” 
Релігійна правда. 07.11.2019.  
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No less difficult is the process of introducing amendments to the Charter of the 
community when Orthodox communities emerge from the jurisdiction of the UOC MP. On the 
one hand, “the standard community charter of the UOC MP is spelled out in such a way that 
any changes are possible only with the consent of the local bishop,”39 (in fact, it makes changes 
impossible, since such an agreement will never be given by a hierarch), and therefore  a conflict 
becomes inevitable.40 It should be noted that these and some other norms (concerning church 
property, etc.) in the Statutes are illegal and have been appealed not only by the communit ies, 
but also by the state department for religious affairs.41 On the other hand, the ruling bishops 
often collect community charters and keep them in the residence of their diocesan government. 
Taking into account the fact that the original statute is required in order to amend, such activity 
by bishops and priests, who agree to give the original statute, can be a significant obstacle to 
the documentation of the will of the faithful. 
  However, opposition to community transitions is now more restrained, but it does not 
prevent community transitions—about 600 of them have already changed (or are in the process 
of changing) their jurisdiction.42 Not all transitions are accompanied by conflict situations. 
There are religious communities where this problem has been solved constructively, with the 
establishment of either regular worship services, or in a way of building new temples for the 
part of the faithful who disagreed with the majority.43 Metropolitan Epiphanius, the head of the 
OCU, formally endorsed the idea of consecutive religious services in temples, where there is a 
division into two communities of different jurisdictions,44 although such an initiative does not 
always find understanding in the UOC MP.45 
Therefore, an analysis of the causes of the confrontation within the Orthodox 
community of Ukraine requires understanding that its grounds are civilizational, not 
institutional. This confrontation goes beyond modern history and concerns the interpretation of 
almost every event (often ecclesiastical) from the separate or shared past of Ukraine and Russia, 
                                                                 
39 “Храм навпіл: як жителі Тернопільщини міняють Московський патріархат на Київський.”  Hromadske. 
20.01.2018. 
40 A classic example of this is the Community Charter of the UOC MP in the village of Popilnya, of the 
Popilnyansky district of Zhytomyr region, the text of which became the cause of lawsuits. See:  “Житомир, село 
Попильня. Предупреждение о захвате храма со стороны представителей ‘Киевского патриархата.’”  
Православіє в Україні. 01.03.2014.    
41 “УПЦ (МП) пише свої статути за зразками РПЦ, - Юраш.” РІСУ. 24.05.2017. 
42 “Перелік громад, що змінили церковну юрисдикцію з УПЦ (МП) на ПЦУ.” uk.wikipedia.org. 
43 “Почергове богослужіння чи будівництво нового храму: на Рівненщині розплутують церковний 
конфлікт.” ЧаРівне.  23.04.2018; “Знайдено порозуміння в с. Стрільчинцях.” Немирівська районна 
державна адміністрація. Офіційний веб-сайт. 19. 04. 2019. and others. 
44 “ПЦУ готова до почергового служіння у храмах громадами різних церков – Епіфаній.”  5-й канал ТБ.  
01.03.2019.  
45 “Митрополит Онуфрій забороняє почергове богослужіння – не дозволяють канони.” РІСУ. 21.01.2016. 
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the “appropriation” by Russia of some church figures from other cultures, or even church 
territories, imposing on Ukraine the paradigm of a common future within some union state. 
According to the plan of the Russian authorities, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus belong to the 
“Russkiy Mir” (the Russian world) and should make the nucleus of this state. Therefore, the 
position of the Moscow Patriarch Kirill (Cyril) who, while meeting with the primate (Patriarch) 
of Constantinople in Istanbul on August 31, 2018, demanded from the Ecumenical Patriarch to 
abandon the idea of giving the Tomos to the Ukrainians. The ground for such a demand was 
the thesis that “the Ukrainians are not an independent people” (at the same time, the same thesis 
is constantly voiced by Putin46), but is only part of the “great Russian people.” According to 
the canons, “one nation cannot be given two Tomoses.”47 It becomes clear afterwards what 
kind of attitudes the priesthood of the UOC MP has concerning the formation of respect for the 
Ukrainian culture, traditions, and statehood in their church members. 
In fact, without Ukraine, Russia seems to lose five centuries of its own history and 
apostolic birthright,48 which means the deepest layers of its own culture.49 This perspective is 
perceived by the Russian secular and ecclesiastical authorities as a tragedy.50 However, 
Russia’s efforts to join the “Kyiv civilization” have an illogical basis for a number of reasons 
of chronological and value nature. Let us note the most important: Kyivan Rus’ had its own 
civilizational paradigm from the very beginning (9th century), radically different from the one 
by which the Grand Duchy of Moscow began to emerge. The latter appeared much later, in the 
15th century. The motives of the Russian establishment are clear: by keeping Ukraine in the 
field of its influence, Russia not only strengthens its geopolitical weight, but also resolves the 
issue of its own civilizational identity, trying at least in part to remain a European state. But do 
                                                                 
46 “Путин назвал русских и украинцев одним народом. Историки объясняют, так ли это.”  ВВС. 21.02.2020.    
47“Эксклюзив: Диалог Варфоломея – Кирилла по украинскому вопросу.” Оrthodoxia.info. 28.09.2018. 
48 It is about the blessing of Kyiv by the apostle Andrew the First -Called. The ancient Russian Chronicle “the 
Story of the Passing Years” authored by Nestor the Chronicler describes the journey of the apostle Andrew from 
Korsun’ to Rome through the Russian land and tells how he put a cross on the Dnieper cliffs and heralded the 
appearance of Kyiv lit up with God's blessed grace. 
49 In this respect, the characteristic efforts of the Russians, for example, in France to present Queen Anna 
Yaroslavna as "Anna Russka, read - Russian", are typical. Or the numerous attempts by Russian “journalists” or 
officials to buy out the remains of Yaroslav the Wise (which are now in the Holy Trinity Church in Brooklyn , 
USA) from 2016 to 2019. See: “Неля Куковальська: Таємниці саркофагу князя Ярослава Мудрого.”  
youtube.com. 23.04.2016.   
50 “Патриарх Кирилл: Попытки оторвать Украинскую церковь от Москвы грозят катастрофой!” 
Комсомольская правда, 27.07.2018;  “Святейший Патриарх Кирилл: Единство Святой Руси основано прежде 
всего на единстве Русской Православной Церкви.” Пресс-служба Патриарха Московского и всея Руси . 
07.10.2019; “Правительство России утвердило на 2016 г. план мероприятий по празднованию 1000-летия 
русского монашества на Афоне.” Pravoslavie.ru. 03.01.2016.; “Послание Президента В.Путина 
Федеральному Собранию РФ.” kremlin.ru. 04.12.2014.  
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the Ukrainian citizens want to have an alliance with Russia? The events of the Revolution of 
Dignity and the ongoing war in the East proved that the answer is “No”. 
    
Prospects for Reconciliation 
Prospects for reconciliation between the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate depend on two factors. First is what kind of 
development strategy these churches will choose. Will this strategy be past-oriented or 
forward-looking? Second is how they will be supported in the Ukrainian society. 
As for the last factor, the results of an all-Ukrainian public opinion poll aimed at 
revealing the attitude of the Ukrainians to individual churches of Ukraine, conducted at the end 
of February 2020, are quite informative. According to the voiced data, among the two largest 
Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the best attitude is observed in the case of the Orthodox Church 
of Ukraine, to which 60.6% of the Ukrainians have a positive attitude. Only 5.4% of them have 
negative (the balance of positive-negative attitude is +55.2%). Moreover, in all regions of the 
country, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine has the highest positive attitudes. Instead, in the case 
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, a negative balance is observed, 
and it is -2.2%. About 25.7% of those polled are positive about this Church and 28% are 
negative.51 From this study, it follows that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is gaining, and the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, on the contrary, is losing its influence 
in society. 
Obviously, the main task of the newly created Orthodox Church of Ukraine is to justify 
the enormous amount of trust it has today among the Ukrainian people, while remaining the 
bearer of “warm sociality”—a source of “We-feeling.”52 In order to do so, it needs to avoid the 
faults of the churches, on the basis of which it has been established: the UOC of the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, and partly the UOC of the Moscow 
Patriarchate. The hereditary disadvantages of these churches were the dominance in their inner 
life of such phenomena as: backstabbing talk; a large number of errors in solving personnel 
issues; actual closeness to social and public influence (participation of seculars in church 
councils was predominantly symbolic); attraction to the Moscow cultural heritage (traditions, 
                                                                 
51 “Ставлення до окремих церков України і очікування від діяльності Православної Церкви України. 
Дослідження проведене Київським міжнародним інститутом соціології з 15 до 27 лютого 2020 року.” 
КМІС. 
52 Н.В. Іщук. Сучасна православна теологія діалогу: філософсько -релігієзнавчий аналіз. (Київ: НПУ                 
ім. М. П. Драгоманова, 2019), p. 339.  
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ceremonies, etc.), diminishing the role of the laity in church life, etc. Finally, neither the 
UAOC, nor the UOC KP was able to go beyond the Moscow tradition of forming the 
educational process and be engaged in the qualitative preparation of theologians. The UOC KP 
and the UAOC have not acquired the skills to carry out educational work in the environment 
not only among the parishioners of the Moscow Patriarchate, but even among their own 
supporters. It is important that both Ukrainian-centered churches (the UAOC and the UOC KP) 
were formed as leadership “church projects” by ex-Patriarch Filaret or the leaders of the UAOC 
(Patriarch Demetrius Yarema, Metropolitan Methodius Kudriakov and Makariy Meletych).  
Therefore, it is no coincidence that the current efforts of Filaret, the former Patriarch of the 
UOC KP, are aimed at the restoration of this structure, which reveals authoritarian tendencies 
in the management of the former UOC KP. However, these attempts are doomed to failure. 
This conclusion is based on the fact that Patriarch Filaret: a) has actually lost support in society 
(does not fit into any ratings); b) lacks human resources (the support of priests and believers), 
and therefore the consecration of new bishops does not lead to any church growth; c) as an 
institution, it does not differ from the OCU, and therefore this church grouping will most likely 
be moved to the margins of the Ukrainian society. 
In fact, only now, with the constitution of the Local Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the 
pro-Ukrainian Orthodoxy is gradually exiting from the Moscow cultural-civilizationa l 
paradigm. Civil society structures of Ukraine are actively assisting this process. Among them 
we will particularly note: the initiators of the “10 Theses for the OCU”53 movement, the 
activists of the “Institute of Church and Society” of the Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy, 
the Kyiv Epiphany Stauropegic Brotherhood, and other public projects.   
The future of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate also depends 
on the willingness to become more open to other Orthodox churches and civil society. This 
church is losing its influence on the Ukrainian society due to its misunderstanding of the 
Ukrainians’ aspirations and unwillingness to adapt to the Ukrainian reality. Refusing to 
recognize the autocephaly of the OCU is just one example of this misunderstanding. The 
rejection of the Ukrainian identity demonstrated by the UOC MP throughout the history of 
Independent Ukraine has been disastrous for itself during the dramatic social shifts and difficult 
trials for the country: the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of the Crimea, and the war in 
                                                                 
53 See: “10 тез для Православної Церкви України.” РІСУ. 31.01. 2019 ; “10 тез для Православної Церкви 
України.” O. H.. Саган,. Православна Церква України: конституювання та перспективи розвитку . (Київ, 
2019), pp. 92-97. 
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Eastern Ukraine. It is important to understand that among the priesthood and believers of this 
church, there are many people who consider Ukraine their homeland, love and even defend it 
with weapons in their hands in the Donbas region. Also, the representatives of these two 
churches are often brought together by friendships and even family relationships. However, the 
UOC MP is organizationally and ideologically dependent on the Moscow Patriarchate, forced 
to uphold another position imposed on it by the Russian Church and the Russian authorit ies. 
For this Church, the way out of the current crisis of public confidence could be to take a more 
autonomous position on its metropolis. But this requires extraordinary courage, willpower and 
a pro-Ukrainian civic position of its leadership, which has not yet been observed. 
Why are we so pessimistic about the ability to overcome the conflict in Orthodoxy in 
Ukraine? The fact is that this confrontation has been constantly inspired from the outside, by 
the Russian secular authorities. The problem is that the ideological work of Moscow secular 
and religious organizations is based on counteracting the return of Ukraine to the European 
civilizational and cultural paradigm. Moreover, it is currently concentrated on the sphere of 
development and activity of the Orthodox institutions in the territory of Ukraine. The 
restoration of the power of the Russian political empire is known to be the declared purpose of 
the current Russian political leadership, the basis for modeling the country’s future, its 
civilizational component.54 The Orthodox identity of the Moscow Orthodox believer is closely 
linked to the formation of the so-called “Eastern Orthodox civilization” (“Eastern European 
Orthodoxy”). However, this civilization gets its key meanings only with the existence of the 
Metropolitanate of Kyiv within the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The rupture of this 
link will destroy the empire-imposed “unity of cultural and civilizational identity of the 
Ukrainians and the Russians.” 
Perhaps in the future (and this depends on the success of the development of the OCU), 
the scale of this confrontation will decrease. Experts are expecting a natural decrease in the 
number of the UOC MP communities through their flow into the OCU. The reason for this 
conclusion is the fact that over the last four to five years, sociologists have shown a steady and 
significant excess of the number of adherents of the Ukrainian model of Orthodoxy (believers 
of the UOC KP, UAOC, and now the OCU) over the Moscow model. However, we believe 
that in a more distant perspective (with the change of generations of priesthood and believers) 
reconciliation and cooperation between the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will possibly happen. “Viewed from a religious 
                                                                 
54 See: Т. Бремер, Церква та імперія. Нариси історії російського православ´я. (Київ: Дух літера, 2019). 
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perspective it is important, regardless of pessimism or optimism, to have hope. These are 
human problems for which there are human solutions.”55 The Churches, the doctrine of which 
calls to love not only the heavenly Fatherland, but also the earthly, united by this same common 
earthly Motherland, cannot forever remain in antagonism with each other. 
 
Conclusions 
Summarizing the analysis of the causes of opposition of the Orthodox churches in 
modern Ukraine, tendencies of their development and prospects of reconciliation, let us note 
that the deep causes of this opposition do not lie in the realm of institutional (organizationa l 
division), personal (interpersonal conflict that led to separation) or even ecclesiastical. There 
were no violations of canons by the opponents of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine.  The 
nature of this confrontation is civilizational. Therefore, there is no easy possibility to overcome 
it, at least not in the near future. 
The current situation in Orthodoxy in Ukraine is fundamentally different even from the 
beginning of the country’s independence. The acquisition of the Tomos and the constitution of 
the Orthodox Church of Ukraine completed the process of establishing Ukraine’s politica l 
independence, which began in 1991. Thus, the process of exiting (and passing the point of no 
return) of the Ukrainian Orthodox component from the so-called “Eastern European 
Orthodoxy” as part of the “Orthodox-Moscow civilization component” finally started. 
Unfortunately, in the future we are doomed to face a further confrontation of Orthodox 
identities in Ukraine. The effectiveness of this confrontation depends both on the activity of 
the civil society of Ukraine and on the ability of the OCU to reorganize and drift apart from the 
Moscow heritage (which is still sufficiently tangible in the now self-liquidating UOC KP and 
UAOC). The latter will also affect the perception of the OCU in the community of  independent 
local Orthodox churches. In view of the current organizational and ideological dependence of 
the UOC MP on the Moscow Patriarchate, it is premature and unjustified to expect a 
constructive dialogic position from this Church. However, in the long run, the UOC MP will 
have to reduce its dependence on the Moscow Center; the alternative is its marginalization in 
Ukraine. The process of individualization of the UOC MP, together with the change of 
generations in the Orthodox churches, will inevitably lead to dialogue, cooperation, and, as a 
consequence, reconciliation between currently antagonistic churches. 
                                                                 
55 Paul B. Mojzes, "Religion in Eastern Europe After the Fall of Communism: From Euphoria to Anxiety," 
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 40: Iss. 1. (2020). Article 3.  
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